More than a decade of research has found strong evidence for P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) (''the Equation"). We argue, however, that this hypothesis provides an overly simplified picture due to its inability to account for relevance. We manipulated relevance in the evaluation of the probability and acceptability of indicative conditionals and found that relevance moderates the effect of P(C|A). This corroborates the Default and Penalty Hypothesis put forward in this paper. Finally, the probability and acceptability of concessive conditionals (''Even if A, then still C") were investigated and it was found that the Equation provides a better account of concessive conditionals than of indicatives across relevance manipulations.
Introduction
In philosophy, there is a widely shared consensus that Stalnaker's Hypothesis is wrong and that Adams' Thesis is correct, due to formal problems affecting the former but not the latterknown as the triviality results.
STALNAKER'S HYPOTHESIS: P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) for all probability distributions where P(A) > 0 and 'If A, then C' expresses a proposition. ADAMS' THESIS: Acc(if A, then C) = P(C|A) for all simple conditionals (i.e., conditionals whose antecedent and consequent clauses are not themselves conditionals), where 'Acc(if A, then C)' denotes the degree of acceptability of 'If A, then C'. 1 TRIVIALITY RESULTS: Lewis' triviality results show that there is no proposition whose probability is equal to P(C|A) for all probability distributions without the latter being subject to trivializing features such as that P(C|A) collapses to P(C) or that positive probabilities can only be assigned to two pairwise incompatible propositions (Bennett, 2003: chap. 5; Woods, 1997: chap. 4, p. 114-8) .
In psychology, there has been a tendency to endorse a thesis very similar to Stalnaker's hypothesis, known as the Equation, which avoids the problems affecting the former by either denying that conditionals express propositions altogether or by endorsing three-valued de Finetti truth tables (Table 1) .
At present, the theories united under the heading 'the New Paradigm of Reasoning', which endorse the Equation, have branched out in different directions. To name just a few, in Baratgin, Politzer, and Over (2013) and Politzer, Over, and Baratgin (2010), the Equation is studied in relation to threevalued de Finetti truth tables in general and its relation to conditional bets is emphasized. In Pfeifer and Kleiter (2011) and Pfeifer (2013), the Equation is endorsed on the basis of a coherence-based probability logic that works with intervals of imprecise probabilities. However, what matters for our purposes is not so much the exact theory in which the Equation is embedded but rather the general commitment to the Equation. As it stands, over a decade of empirical research has found strong evidence in favor of the Equation and a recent study has begun to challenge Adams' Thesis, as nicely outlined in Douven (2015b: chap. 3, 4) .
In contrast, a basic intuition that has emerged repeatedly throughout the history of philosophy is that in conditionals like 'If it rains, then the match will be cancelled' the antecedent and 
